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KEEPING UP WITH THE GAME: THE USE OF
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES
Lance Wyatt†
Determining damages is an integral stage in the patent litigation
process. Since 1970, reasonable royalty damages have been calculated
using the factors set forth in the seminal decision Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. United States Plywood Corp. However, these factors are prone to
manipulation and abuse by damages experts. To address this abuse,
damages experts have utilized a solution to a two-person bargaining
situation, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), as a method to
calculate reasonable royalty damages in patent infringement cases.
Since the introduction of NBS in patent infringement cases, courts have
been reluctant to admit the use of the NBS to calculate reasonable
royalty damages because damages experts often fail to apply the
specific facts of the case to their calculations or adequately explain the
NBS.
This article argues that courts should allow the use of the NBS by
damages experts as a viable method to calculate a reasonable royalty
in patent infringement cases, despite recent backlash at the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals. First, the NBS, if properly used, adequately
applies the facts of each specific case to its analysis. Second, the NBS
is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic theory that can be
adequately explained. Finally, the NBS is more impartial than the
Georgia-Pacific analysis.

† J.D., 2014, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.S. Biomedical Engineering, 2011, Texas
A&M University. The author is currently clerking as a judicial law clerk for a district judge in the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The author dedicates this article to his
mother, Marcy Boyd Rhodes. The author also dedicates this article to John Nash, who passed
away in a tragic car accident shortly before its publication, and whose pioneering research in game
theory provides the basis for this article.
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INTRODUCTION
Determining damages is an integral stage in the patent litigation
process. Reasonable royalty damages are the prevalent form of relief in
patent cases.1 Section 284 of the Patent Act governs damages in these
cases and provides that, at a minimum, a patent holder should receive
a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention by the infringer upon
a finding of infringement.2 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has defined a reasonable royalty as:
[T]he amount of money which the owner of a patent would accept
who is desirous of licensing another to use her patent in return for a
royalty, but is not forced by financial need or other compulsion to
1. John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable
Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 769 (2013).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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do so, and the amount which a person would be willing to pay as a
royalty who is desirous of obtaining a license to use the invention,
but who is not compelled to do so.3

Since 1970, reasonable royalty damages have been calculated
using the factors set forth in the seminal decision, Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.4 These factors are used to
3. Maxwell v. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
4. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). The factors include:
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
(2) The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
(3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
(4) The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
(5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
(6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative
or convoyed sales.
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
(8) The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
(9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
(10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
(12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
(13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
(14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
(15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that
is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article
embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.
Id. at 1120.

09_ARTICLE_WYATT (DO NOT DELETE)

430

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

6/25/2015 1:15 PM

[Vol. 31

construct a hypothetical negotiation between a patent holder and an
infringer at the time the patent was first infringed.5 However, these
factors are prone to manipulation and abuse by damages experts.6
Because of these problems with existing methods, damages experts
have introduced alternative methods to calculate a reasonable royalty.
In 1950, John Nash, Jr., developed a solution to a two-person
bargaining situation.7 While its soundness in economic theory has been
established for over 60 years, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) has
only recently burst onto the scene in the calculation of reasonable
royalty damages in patent infringement cases. In its simplest terms, the
NBS “compares the profits for each party—proceeding rationally,
competently, and fully informed—both in entering and not entering
into the completed transaction. Relative bargaining positions determine
how the parties split the gains provided by the contemplated
agreement.”8
Economists William Choi and Roy Weinstein tailored the NBS in
2001 for the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in patent
infringement cases.9 Additionally, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro
tailored the NBS as a method to calculate reasonable royalty damages
in 2007.10 Since then, countless legal scholars have examined the NBS
in relation to reasonable royalty damages. The NBS first found its way
onto the patent infringement landscape in 2011.11
Since its introduction in patent infringement cases, district courts
have been reluctant to admit the use of the NBS to calculate reasonable
royalty damages. Two reasons have fueled this reluctance. First,
damages experts often use the NBS improperly, failing to apply the
specific facts of the case to their calculations.12 Second, damages
experts typically fail to adequately explain the NBS to courts and

5. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 1, at 772.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
8. John. B. Scherling & Ryan M. Sullivan, Rational Reasonable Royalty Damages: A
Return to the Roots, 4 LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 56, 57–58.
9. See William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty
Rate Calculations, 41 IDEA 49 (2001).
10. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991 (2007).
11. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
12. See id. at 1119 (“In particular, Dr. Cockburn glossed over the axioms underlying the
Nash solution without citing any evidence to show that those assumptions were warranted in the
present case. In this respect, his analysis was not based on sufficient facts.”) (internal citation
omitted).
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juries.13 While most district courts have not allowed the use of the NBS
in patent cases, some district courts have allowed its use.14 However,
the Federal Circuit recently expressed disdain toward the NBS,
agreeing “with the courts that have rejected invocations of the Nash
theorem without sufficiently establishing that the premises of the
theorem actually apply to the facts of the case at hand.”15
Despite this distaste, courts should allow the use of the NBS by
damages experts as a viable method to calculate a reasonable-royalty
rate in patent infringement cases for three reasons. First, if properly
used, the NBS adequately applies the facts of each specific case to its
analysis. Second, the NBS is grounded in sound, unmanipulable
economic theory that can be adequately explained. Third, the NBS is
more impartial than the Georgia-Pacific analysis.
While many legal scholars have examined the NBS in relation to
patent damages, few scholars have examined it in light of the Federal
Circuit’s recent VirnetX opinion and subsequent district court opinions.
Even fewer scholars have advocated for the use of the NBS as a viable
method for calculating a reasonable-royalty rate in patent cases. This
article analyzes the recent court decisions regarding the NBS and
advocates for its use, despite significant judicial hostility.
Many methods have been used to calculate reasonable royalty
damages, including the longstanding Georgia-Pacific analysis, the
analytical approach, the entire-market-value rule, the established
royalty for the patent, the cost-savings approach, and the rule-of-thumb
approach.16 In 2011, the 25% rule of thumb, used by courts as a tool to
determine reasonable royalty in patent cases, was held inadmissible by
the Federal Circuit.17 The rule presumed that a licensee in a
hypothetical negotiation would be willing to pay a royalty rate of 25%
of the profits from the product that incorporated the patent at issue.18
However, in Uniloc, the Federal Circuit abolished the rule as a
“fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a
hypothetical negotiation.”19 The court reasoned that “[e]vidence
relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus inadmissible under
13. See id. (“He did not, however, adequately explain this method or tie it to facts in the
record.”)
14. See infra Part III.
15. Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
16. See Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH &
RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited May 19, 2015).
17. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
18. Id. at 1312.
19. Id. at 1315.
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Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”20 Although
Uniloc attempted to apply the Georgia-Pacific factors to adjust the
25% baseline rate up or down, the court explained that, because the
analysis started from a fundamentally flawed premise, “adjusting it
based on legitimate considerations specific to the facts of the case
nevertheless results in a fundamentally flawed conclusion.”21
Since 2011, courts have been quick to reject the NBS for the same
reasons articulated by the Federal Circuit in abolishing the 25% rule of
thumb in Uniloc.22 Most courts quickly assume that the NBS is a 50%
rule of thumb shrouded in complex mathematics.23 However, as this
article will demonstrate, the NBS is a sound economic theory that often
produces royalty rates other than 50%. While most courts have not
allowed the use of the NBS in patent cases, some courts have allowed
its use under very narrow circumstances. For example, one court
allowed a damages expert to use the NBS “as a check on the
reasonableness of the rate reached through his Georgia-Pacific
analysis.”24
In patent cases, courts have generally stated that the use of the
NBS to calculate a reasonable royalty is impermissible because it
cannot be adequately explained and it does not apply the specific facts
of the case to its calculations.25 However, this article will demonstrate
that the NBS can become a viable method for calculating reasonable
royalty without running afoul of the concerns expressed by the Federal
Circuit.
The NBS has been in existence for over 50 years and, since then,
has been peer-reviewed by countless economists and legal theorists.
Working from this foundation, economists and damages experts
William Choi and Roy Weinstein developed equations that tailored the
NBS to the reasonable-royalty calculation.26 The variables in these
equations force damages experts to apply the specific facts of a case to
the NBS. These variables include the disagreement payoff for the
patent holder, representing the profit the patent holder/licensor expects
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1317.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See Oracle, supra note 10.
24. Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. C-08-04990 JW, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56784, at *15–16, n.19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9.
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to receive if the negotiation fails, the disagreement payoff for the
infringer, the feasible payoff from licensing, which is the total profit
from licensing, and the profit for the patent holder and infringer,
respectively, from licensing.27 Finally, utilization of these formulas
provides impartial results, which are favorable when compared to the
easily-manipulable Georgia-Pacific analysis.
Proper utilization of the NBS as a viable method used to calculate
a reasonable royalty in patent cases would have many positive
implications. For example, it would provide impartial results that
would be difficult to manipulate. Moreover, it would ground the
damages calculation in sound economic theory, rather than in
manipulable factors that are burdensome and difficult to explain.
This article will demonstrate why courts should allow the use of
the NBS as a viable method to determine reasonable royalties in patent
infringement cases. Part I of this article provides an overview of the
NBS and its relation to determining reasonable royalty damages. Part
II examines cases that have either allowed or rejected the use of the
NBS. Part III explains why courts should use the NBS by
demonstrating its incorporation of the facts of each case, its ability to
be adequately explained, and its impartiality compared to the GeorgiaPacific factor analysis. Finally, Part IV concludes the article by urging
damages experts and courts alike to utilize the NBS to determine
reasonable royalty damages.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In 1950, John Nash, Jr. developed a solution to a two-person
cooperative-bargaining situation.28 This area of economics is known as
game theory, and Nash was eventually awarded a Nobel Prize in 1994
for his solution.29 Nash described his solution as “a determination of
the amount of satisfaction each individual should expect to get from the
situation, or, rather, a determination of how much it should be worth to
each of these individuals to have this opportunity to bargain.”30 For
more than 60 years, Nash’s solution has garnered praise throughout the

27. See id. at 54–55.
28. See Nash, The Bargaining Problem, supra note 7.
29. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1994 (Oct. 11, 1994).
30. See Nash, The Bargaining Problem, supra note 7, at 155.
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economic community and has been widely accepted as a sound
economic theory.31
An understanding of the NBS is enhanced by a cursory overview
of the theory of bilateral monopoly, a market with one buyer and one
seller. This theory teaches that a negotiated price between one buyer
and one seller cannot be precisely specified, but rather will be found in
an indeterminate range.32 As economists, Roy Weinstein, Frank
Stabile, and Ken Romig, explain:
This range is determined by each party’s “walk away” price. For the
buyer (i.e. the defendant or hypothetical licensee), this price
represents any price above the highest possible price it is willing to
pay. For the seller (i.e. the plaintiff or hypothetical licensor), the
walk-away price represents any price below the lowest possible
price it is willing to accept. The range of prices between the seller’s
minimum price and the buyer’s maximum price constitute a range
of mutually acceptable prices.33

The NBS, therefore, allows one to narrow or, in some cases,
eliminate this range of indeterminacy by providing “a generally
accepted framework for identifying and evaluating factors that
influence negotiation outcomes between parties.”34
In 2001, economists William Choi and Roy Weinstein realized
that the NBS could be used to calculate reasonable royalty damages in

31. The following is a list of recommended reading regarding the economics and
mathematics behind the NBS: John Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA,
128 (1953); Kenneth Chan, Trade Negotiations in a Nash Bargaining Model, 25 J. INT’L ECON.
353 (1988); Mark Gertler & Antonella Trigari, Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash
Wage Bargaining, 117 J. POL. ECON. 38 (2009); Eric Greenleaf et al., Guarantees in Auctions:
The Action House as Negotiator and Managerial Decision Maker, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1130 (1993);
Eran Hanany et al., Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion Bargaining, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1785
(2007); Lawrence Kahn, Free Agency, Long-Term Contracts and Compensation in Major League
Baseball: Estimates from Panel Data, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 157 (1993); Amitava Krishna Dutt
& Anindya Sen, Union Bargaining Power, Employment, and Output in a Model of Monopolistic
Competition with Wage Bargaining, 65 J. ECON. 1 (1997); Alvin E. Roth, Axiomatic Models of
Bargaining, (M. Beckmann & H. P. Kunzi eds., 1979); PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (William Nordhaus ed., 12th ed. 1985); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME
THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (1991); Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986); Ariel Rubenstein et al., On the Interpretation
of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences, 60
ECONOMETRICA 1171 (1992).
32. Roy Weinstein et al., Taming Complex Intellectual Property Compensation Problems,
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 547, 554 (2013).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 555.
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patent infringement cases.35 First, they noted the conditions, or axioms,
that Nash used in his theory.36 These axioms are as follows:
(1) Pareto efficiency; that is, there should be no other feasible
allocation that is (a) better than the solution for one negotiator
and (b) not worse than the solution for the other negotiator.
(2) Negotiators must collectively behave in a rational manner such
that neither side gets less in the bargaining solution than could be
obtained in disagreement.
(3) The solution is independent of any numeric specification; that is,
if we change the way we measure the payoffs when we construct
a two-person bargaining problem, then the solution corresponds
to the same outcome.
(4) Eliminating alternatives other than the disagreement profits
(opportunity costs from licensing) that would not have been
chosen should not affect the solution.
(5) If the disagreement profits of the two parties are equal in the
bargaining problem, then the solution also should treat them
equally.37

With these conditions as a foundation, the authors noted that
“Nash demonstrated that satisfying these conditions yields a unique
solution . . . where the bargaining outcome rests simply on each
negotiator’s alternative to negotiating and the potential benefits of
cooperation.”38 In other words, the satisfaction of these conditions
results in an outcome dependent upon the bargaining parties’ back-up
alternatives and the benefits arising from a mutual cooperation.
The authors then applied Nash’s theory to reasonable royalty
damages, stating that “the NBS requires only knowledge or estimation
of (1) the ‘disagreement’ profits of both the licensee and licensor; and
(2) the total profits from a licensing agreement.”39 First, the authors
defined the variables necessary to perform the NBS in a reasonableroyalty context.40 One of the variables included the disagreement
profits of the patent holder.41 Disagreement profits represent the profits
a patent holder expects to receive in the event that negotiation fails.42

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
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The authors defined this variable as d1.43 Next, the authors defined the
variable of the disagreement profits of the infringer/licensee as d2.44
This variable represents the profits that an infringer/licensee expects to
receive in the event that negotiation fails.45 The disagreement profits
are representative of each party’s relative bargaining position.46 If
either party has backup plans in the event that negotiation fails, their
bargaining position increases, relative to the value of the backup
plans.47 Additionally, the authors defined the variable Π as the total
incremental profit from licensing.48 Finally, the authors defined the
variables π1 and π2 “as profit for the patent holder and
infringer/licensee, respectively, from licensing.”49
After defining the variables, the authors developed equations
combining the defined variables and the Nash axioms.50 First, the
authors explained that Nash’s theory demonstrated that the only point
that satisfies his axioms is the one obtained by solving the following
maximization problem:
maxπ1,π2 (π1 – d1) (π2 – d2)

(1)

subject to the following conditions:
π1 ≥ d1,

(2)

π2 ≥ d2,

(3)

π1 + π2 ≤ Π

(4)51

From there, the authors examined the effects of transfer payments
being permitted between the two parties.52 This examination provided
the authors with three factors that fully characterized the bargaining
problem: (1) the disagreement payoff for the patent holder; (2) the
disagreement payoff for the infringer/licensee; and (3) the total

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transferable wealth available to the two parties from licensing.53 The
authors then established the conditions for the equilibrium payoffs as:
𝜋𝜋1∗ – d1 = 𝜋𝜋2∗ – d2,
where

𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖∗

(5)

𝜋𝜋1∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = ∏,

(6)

𝜋𝜋1∗ = 𝑑𝑑1 + (Π − 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2 ),

(7)

represents the equilibrium payoff for firm i.

54

Next, the authors solved the conditions for the equilibrium
payoffs, yielding the NBS:
1
2
1

𝜋𝜋2∗ = 𝑑𝑑2 + (Π − 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2 ),
2

𝜋𝜋1∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = Π

(8)
(9)55

The authors then explained the implications of these equations.
First, the authors noted that equations (7) and (8) demonstrate that the
parties “bargain over the partition of total profits (Π); they first agree
to give each other the payment that they respectively would obtain from
not reaching agreement; then, they split the remaining profits
equally.”56 For either party, the agreement payoff is greater when its
disagreement point is higher than the disagreement point of the
opposing party.57 Therefore, the relative bargaining power is dependent
upon either side’s “respective outside opportunities.”58
The authors concluded their development of the NBS for the
calculation of reasonable royalty damages by noting:
The fundamental insight of the NBS is that the alternatives to
agreement that are available to each side limit how good a bargain
the other partner can obtain. These alternatives set a lower limit on
the share each side willingly will accept. Under the NBS, the two
sides called upon to split a pie will divide the bargaining surplus—
which is bounded by each bargainer’s threat point or reservation
price—down the middle, so that each has an equal share.
An alternative way of thinking about the NBS is in the framework
of an implicit arbitrator who tries to distribute the gains from trade
or, more generally, from cooperation in a manner that reflects fairly
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the bargaining strength of the two negotiators. Once each side’s
disagreement payoffs are determined, an arbitrator applies the NBS
to obtain an efficient and fair solution. In the following section, we
apply the NBS to the calculation of a reasonable royalty.59

Choi and Weinstein’s development of the NBS in the context of
patent damages provides a useful method for calculating reasonable
royalty damages that is grounded in sound economic theory. Other
scholars have applied the NBS in the context of patent damages as
well.60 For instance, in 2007, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro,
developed mathematical equations that applied the theory of the NBS
to reasonable-royalty calculations.61 These equations were more
simplified than those developed by Weinstein and Choi. First, Lemley
and Shapiro defined the variables of their equations.62 The noteworthy
variables included:
V: The Value per unit of the patented feature to the downstream firm
in comparison with the next best alternative technology. For
example, if the patented feature enhances the value of the product to
consumers by $1 over the next best alternative, then V = $1.
Similarly, if it reduces the cost of manufacturing the good by $1,
then V = $1. . . .
θ: The Strength of the patent, i.e., the probability that litigation will
result in a finding that the patent is valid and infringed by the
downstream firm’s product. . . .
B: The Bargaining skill of the patent holder, as measured by the
fraction of the combined gains from settling, rather than litigating,

59. Id. at 55–56 (citation omitted).
60. Legal commentators have analyzed the method and applicability of the NBS in patent
damages calculations but have not commented on the legal aspects of its use. See, e.g., RICHARD
F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE 26–31 (2d ed. 2011); John C. Jarosz &
Michael J. Chapman, Application of Game Theory to Intellectual Property Royalty Negotiations,
in LICENSING BEST PRACTICES 241–65 (Robert Goldscheider & Alan H. Gordon eds., 2006);
Jonathan D. Putnam & Andrew B. Tepperman, Bargaining and the Construction of Economically
Consistent Hypothetical License Negotiations, THE LICENSING JOURNAL, Aug. 2004, at 7;
Elizabeth M. Bailey, Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 255 (2011); A. Frank Adams, III et al., PATENT ROYALTY RATES: A LOOK AT
RECENT COURT DECISIONS (2008); Chester C. McGuire, Simulation Modeling in Forensic
Economics: The Example of Reasonable Royalty Negotiations, 4 LITIGATION ECONOMICS DIGEST
15 (1999); T. PAUL TANPITUKPONGSE & KANAV HASIJA, GAME THEORY: A ZOOMING AND
SLIDING METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN PATENT DAMAGES
(2011).
61. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10.
62. Id. at 1996–97.
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that are captured by the patent holder. This variable falls between 0
and 1. Equal bargaining skill, B = 0.5, is a common assumption.63

Using these variables, Lemley and Shapiro explained that “the
benchmark royalty rate for an ironclad patent is equal to B x V.”64
Additionally, the authors demonstrated that “[m]ore generally, the
benchmark royalty rate is given by θ x B x V.”65 While Lemley and
Shapiro’s equations can be useful, the analysis of this article will focus
solely on the equations developed by Choi and Weinstein. This
reasoning is based upon Choi and Weinstein’s use of more fact-specific
variables than the equations set forth by Lemley and Shapiro.
II. PATENT DAMAGES CASELAW PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
Before an in-depth analysis of the caselaw surrounding the NBS,
it is useful to provide a brief overview of patent-damages caselaw prior
to the introduction of the NBS. This overview will highlight alternative
damages models that have been used, without providing a detailed
analysis of each method, and will help to frame the forthcoming
analysis of the article.
The predominant method for calculating a reasonable-royalty rate
has been the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to construct a
hypothetical negotiation.66 Other methodologies have been used with
varying success.67 For example, one methodology that has been used is
the analytical approach.68 This approach:

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1999.
65. Id.
66. Christopher Marchese et al., Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty
Damages, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2014).
67. See id.
68. Id. (“The Federal Circuit approved this method in TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura
Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). There, the infringer had
an internal memo just before infringement began projecting a gross profit of about 50% for each
infringing sale, from which the projected net profit was computed to be about 40% of the
anticipated sales price. As the standard industry net profit was about 10% of the sales price, the
special master awarded the patentee a reasonable royalty damages rate of the difference—30%.
This rate was then applied to the infringer’s actual sales figures to calculate the reasonable royalty
damages. It had nothing to do with any hypothetical negotiation. Instead, it was strictly an
apportionment based on the infringer’s projections. The Federal Circuit not only affirmed, but it
also expressly rejected the infringer’s contention that the Georgia-Pacific approach was the only
possible approach to computing reasonable royalty damages. The Federal Circuit made it clear
that other approaches were possible, and this one was proper.”).
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[I]nvolves calculating damages based on the infringer’s own internal
profit projections for the infringing item at the time the infringement
began, and then apportioning the projected profit between the parties
as a percentage of sales. The patentee’s percentage is then applied
to the sales dollars for the actual infringing sales to determine the
reasonable royalty damages.69

Additionally, patent infringement plaintiffs began using the 25% rule
of thumb to calculate a reasonable-royalty rate.70 The 25% rule of
thumb “presumed that a licensee in a hypothetical negotiation would
be willing to pay a royalty rate of 25 percent of profits on the product
that incorporated the patent at issue.”71
In 2011, the 25% rule of thumb was held inadmissible.72 In
Uniloc, the Federal Circuit abolished the rule as a “fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation,” holding that “[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent rule of
thumb is thus inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of
the case at issue.”73 Although Uniloc attempted to apply the GeorgiaPacific factors to bring the 25 % royalty rate up or down, the court
explained that, because the analysis started from a fundamentally
flawed premise, “adjusting it based on legitimate considerations
specific to the facts of the case nevertheless results in a fundamentally
flawed conclusion.”74 After the 25% rule was stricken, damages experts
began utilizing the NBS to calculate reasonable royalty damages.75
III. PATENT CASES ADDRESSING THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
The cases that follow demonstrate how courts have treated the
NBS in patent infringement cases since its introduction in 2011. While
some courts have allowed damages experts to use the NBS to calculate
a reasonable royalty, many courts have not. Even still, most courts that
have allowed damages experts to use the NBS have only allowed its
use in conjunction with other methods. This Part revolves primarily
around the Federal Circuit’s VirnetX opinion, which precluded
69. Id. The authors also mention four other possible methodologies for calculating a
reasonable royalty. These methodologies include “Rule of Thumb,” “Established Royalty for the
Patent,” “Many Licenses in a Small Range of Rates,” and “Cost Savings.” Id.
70. Id.
71. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1315.
74. Id. at 1317.
75. See infra Part III-B.
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plaintiff’s use of the NBS, as well as the treatment of the NBS before
and after VirnetX.
A. Pre-VirnetX Cases Excluding the Use of the Nash
Bargaining Solution by Damages Experts
The United States District Courts for the Northern District of
California and the Eastern District of Virginia are hotbeds of patent
litigation.76 However, both courts have excluded the use of the NBS by
damages experts.77 For example, in Oracle, the District Court for the
Northern District of California rejected the use of the NBS in
determining a reasonable royalty in patent damages.78 The court
explained that, although the damages expert “purported to use the Nash
bargaining solution to project bargaining outcomes and calculate the
resulting payments and royalties in the hypothetical negotiation,” he
did not adequately explain this method or tie it to the facts of the case.79
More specifically, the court held that the damages expert “glossed over
the axioms underlying the Nash solution without citing any evidence
to show that those assumptions were warranted in the present case,”
and therefore, allowing the expert to testify would have risked
misleading the jury “as to the soundness of the foundation for his
conclusions.”80 Further, the court explained that, because the NBS
involves complex mathematics, “no jury could follow this Greek or
testimony trying to explain it . . . [and the NBS] would invite a
miscarriage of justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption in an
impenetrable facade of mathematics.”81 Therefore, the court excluded
the expert’s testimony under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and advised the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to guide a royalty
analysis.82
Additionally, in Suffolk, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Daubert, excluded the testimony of plaintiff’s damages expert, Roy
76. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY (2014),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf
77. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Suffolk
Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., No. 1:12-cv-625, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64630 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12,
2013).
78. Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
79. Id. at 1119 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1120.
82. Id.
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Weinstein.83 Weinstein’s damages opinion provided an analysis of the
“revenue stream associated with the putative infringing product” under
the Georgia-Pacific factors, and then a hypothetical negotiation under
the NBS.84 Weinstein’s hypothetical negotiation resulted in a 50/50
split of the incremental profits attributed to the patent-in-suit.85 The
court held that Weinstein’s 50/50 split was not tied to the facts of the
case and therefore, “no different from the 25% rule of thumb rejected
in Uniloc.”86 Although Weinstein used the Georgia-Pacific factors in
his overall analysis, the court explained that “[t]he order in which the
Georgia-Pacific factors are applied does not change the fundamental
and fatal flow of both calculations, namely that the hypothetical rule of
thumb was not tied to the facts of the case.”87
B. Pre-VirnetX Cases Excluding the Use of a 50/50 Split by
Damages Experts
While some damages experts have simply applied a 50/50 split
without further mention of the NBS, courts have excluded this practice
and likened it to the functional equivalent of the NBS. For example, in
Dynetix, the court excluded the opinion of Plaintiff’s damages expert,
Dr. William H. Black. Dr. Black started his opinion with “the
presumption that ‘one reasonable starting place’ for the licensing rate
would be half of the gross margin of the infringing products.”88 The
court held that Dr. Black’s analysis was improper under the Uniloc
standard.89 The court opined that Dr. Black “considered no analogous
facts of the case here other than the presumed validity of the patent
[and] . . . failed to cite any evidence to support his conclusion that the
50% starting place would apply to component parts.”90 While Dr. Black
did not mention the NBS in his analysis, it is worth noting that the court
likened his analysis to the NBS, citing the Oracle decision.91

83. Suffolk Techs. LLC v. AOL Inc., No. 1:12-cv-625, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64630, at
*6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013).
84. Id. at *4–*5.
85. Id. at *5.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *5–*6.
88. Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C 11-05973 PSG, 2013 WL
4538210, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5, n.34.
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Additionally, in Robocast, the court excluded the testimony of
Plaintiff’s damages expert, Creighton Hoffman.92 In Hoffman’s expert
report, he used the Georgia-Pacific factors to conclude “that an equal
split of the benefits would be reasonable and could be negotiated by the
parties to the hypothetical negotiation.”93 While Hoffman’s report did
not mention NBS or game theory, the court concluded that “there is no
doubt that the reasoning behind [Hoffman’s] purported 50/50 profit
split is premised on these models.”94 From there, the court noted that
Hoffman “did not discuss the relative bargaining power of Microsoft
and Robocast.”95 Furthermore, the court held that “Mr. Hoffman's
discussion of the facts specific to this case would be insufficient even
if the ‘relative bargaining power’ issue did not exist.”96 Finally, the
court concluded its analysis by noting that “while the Nash Bargaining
Solution of a 50/50 split has a more prestigious academic pedigree than
the 25% rule of thumb, both are non-starters in a world where damages
must be tied to the facts of the case.”97
C. Pre–VirtnetX Cases Allowing the Use of the Nash
Bargaining Solution
Other courts have also allowed damages experts to use the NBS,
but in these cases, the NBS is used in conjunction with other methods.
For example, in Mformation, the Northern District of California
allowed the use of the NBS as a “check” on an analysis under the
Georgia-Pacific factors.98 Defendants moved to exclude the testimony
of plaintiff’s damages expert Roy Weinstein, arguing that the NBS,
used in determining a reasonable royalty, was an impermissible rule of
thumb.99 The court held that because Weinstein had performed an
extensive analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors, his use of the
NBS “as a check on the reasonableness of the rate reached through his
Georgia-Pacific analysis” did not constitute a ground for exclusion of
his testimony.100 The court further explained that exclusion was not
92. Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 10-1055-RGA, 2014 WL 350062, at *3 (D. Del.
Jan. 29, 2014).
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id.
98. Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. C-08-04990 JW, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56784, at *15–16, n.19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
99. Id. at *14.
100. Id. at *15–*16, n.19.
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necessary because “Weinstein used [the NBS] in addition to, rather
than in lieu of, the Georgia-Pacific analysis.”101 This case provides an
example of when courts allow the use of the NBS but only in a limited
sense. This court did not allow the use of the NBS as the sole method
in calculating a reasonable royalty.
Additionally, in Summit 6, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern
District of Texas allowed plaintiff’s use of the NBS.102 Defendant
argued that Plaintiff’s damages expert, Benoit, used a flawed analysis,
combining the use of a non-patent-practicing component of the device,
reliance on market research surveys, and application of the NBS.103
Defendant argued that the use of the NBS was an improper 50% rule
of thumb that had been rejected by courts.104 However, “Benoit testified
that the NBS only looks to surplus profit, and allows for a variance in
dividing the surplus profit where there is an otherwise unquantifiable
difference in the bargaining position.”105 Accordingly, the court found
that Benoit’s use of the NBS was not an improper 50% rule of thumb,
but actually “based on his belief that because neither party had a
stronger negotiating position, they would have split the profits
evenly.106 The court also emphasized that:
[T]he Federal Circuit's explanation that a district court should not
use Daubert “to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying an
expert's testimony. Questions about what facts are most relevant or
reliable to calculating a reasonable royalty are for the jury. The jury
was entitled to hear the expert testimony and decide for itself what
to accept or reject.”107

Moreover, in Sanofi-Aventis, the court allowed the use of the NBS
by the plaintiffs’ damages expert.108 Although the court never explicitly
mentioned the NBS, plaintiff’s expert Mohan Rao determined his
reasonable-royalty rate using game theory, which is synonymous with
the NBS.109 The defendants, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, moved to
preclude the plaintiffs from offering expert testimony utilizing the
101. Id. at *16, n.19.
102. Summit 6 LLC v. Research in Motion Corp., No. 3:11-cv-367-O, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95164, at *32 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2013).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *36–*37.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
108. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm., Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855,
2011 WL 383861, at *13 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011).
109. Id. at 12.

09_ARTICLE_WYATT (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

NBS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES

6/25/2015 1:15 PM

445

NBS.110 Defendants argued that the NBS is indistinguishable from the
25% rule of thumb because it essentially applies a 50% rule of thumb
to determine the reasonable-royalty rate.111 Defendants argued that the
damages expert “mechanically applied a 50/50 profit split” between the
parties.112 On the other hand, plaintiffs argued that the NBS is “the
standard model in economics for calculating the outcome of a
negotiation, is recognized as a scientific method in determining
reasonable-royalty rates, and is unrelated to the 25 percent rule rejected
in Uniloc.”113 Additionally, plaintiffs argued that the damages expert
reached his result under the NBS “after considering the facts of the
case, specifically the relationship between the parties and their relative
bargaining power, the relationship between the patent and the accused
product, the standard profit margins in the industry, and the presumed
validity of the patent.”114 Ultimately, the court determined that the
damages expert “did not arbitrarily apply a 50/50 profit split akin to the
25 percent rule rejected in Uniloc but rather based his reasonable
royalty analysis on the specific facts of this case.”115
Additionally, in Gen Probe, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California ruled on a Daubert motion to exclude
testimony of Gen-Probe’s damages expert, Michael Wagner.116
Wagner’s damages report was based on the NBS and the entire-marketvalue rule.117 Becton Dickinson argued that Wagner’s calculations
were based on arbitrary profit splits similar to the 25% rule of thumb.118
Gen-Probe countered that Wagner’s calculations “were influenced,
appropriately, by the facts of the case, including the competitive
environment and Gen-Probe’s policy of exploiting its own patents—
considerations approved in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.”119 The court
agreed with Gen-Probe, holding that Wagner’s analysis was tied to the

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *13.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No.3:09-cv-02319-BENNLS, 2012 WL
9335913 (S.D. Cal Nov. 26, 2012).
117. See TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The entire
market value rule allows for the recovery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus
containing several features, when the feature patented constitutes the basis for customer
demand.”).
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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facts of the case and that his testimony would not be excluded on those
grounds.120
Finally, in VirnetX, Judge Leonard Davis of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas allowed plaintiff’s use of the
NBS.121 Defendant argued that the testimony of plaintiff’s damages
expert, Roy Weinstein, should have been excluded because of his use
of the NBS.122 Defendant maintained that Weinstein’s use of the NBS
was improper because he failed to use generally accepted methods of
applying the NBS, failed to explain why a 45%–55% profit split
between the parties would have occurred, and arbitrarily applied a
profit split “akin to the disdained 25% rule,” having “no basis in
reality.”123 The court held, however, that Weinstein adequately
supported his NBS-based theory, providing substantial evidence to
support his theory.124 First, Weinstein calculated the contribution of the
patented feature to defendant’s total profits “by estimating the price
differential between the accused product and the last previous version
of the product not capable of supporting the feature.”125
Next, Weinstein reduced the revenue by the percentage of the
revenue associated with the addition of the patented feature, relying on
the price of the technology that enabled the feature.126 Finally,
Weinstein accounted for the 45%–55% profit split, “explaining that
[plaintiff] would have been in a weaker bargaining position at the time
of the negotiation because of its financial situation.”127 Weinstein’s use
of the NBS was admissible because it was adequately applied to the
facts of the case.128 This case demonstrates that the resulting royalty
rate under the NBS will not always be 50%. Instead, the bargaining
power of either party has the potential to bring the rate up or down.
While the examples are few and far between, Weinstein’s use of the
NBS was proper, and as a result, was allowed by the court.
D. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
The Federal Circuit recently issued an opinion regarding the
disparity among federal district courts’ treatment of the Nash
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
See VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Bargaining Solution.129 The Federal Circuit agreed “with the courts that
have rejected invocations of the Nash theorem without sufficiently
establishing that the premises of the theorem actually apply to the facts
of the case at hand.”130 More specifically, the court explained:
The problem with Weinstein's use of the Nash Bargaining Solution,
though somewhat different, is related, and just as fatal to the
soundness of the testimony. The Nash theorem arrives at a result that
follows from a certain set of premises. It itself asserts nothing about
what situations in the real world fit those premises. Anyone seeking
to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must
establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by
the theorem only on those premises. Weinstein did not do so. This
was an essential failing in invoking the Solution. Moreover, we do
not believe that the reliability of this methodology is saved by
Weinstein's attempts to account for the unique facts of the case in
deviating from the 50/50 starting point.131

The court further warned that “Weinstein's thin attempts to
explain his 10% deviation from the 50/50 baseline in this case
demonstrate how this methodology is subject to abuse. . . . Such
conclusory assertions cannot form the basis of a jury's verdict.”132
Additionally, the court expressed concern that “[a]lthough the result of
that equation would be mathematically sound if properly applied by the
jury, there is concern that the high royalty base would cause the jury to
deviate upward from the proper outcome.”133 Finally, the court did note
one difference between the NBS and the 25% rule of thumb: “where
the 25% rule was applied to the entire profits associated with the
allegedly infringing product, the Nash theory focuses only on the
incremental profits earned by the infringer from the use of the asserted
patents.”134
There are several key takeaways from the Federal Circuit’s
opinion. First, the court did not place an outright bar on the use of the
NBS. Rather, it merely held that Weinstein’s application of the NBS
was insufficiently tied to the facts of the case.135

129. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This was an
appeal from the VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc. decision discussed in Part IV-D.
130. Id. at 1332.
131. Id. at 1332–33.
132. Id. at 1333.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Second, the court provided guidance as to how an expert could
properly apply the NBS, explaining that the NBS is only applicable
when the facts of the case fit the premises provided by the NBS.136 For
example, one of the premises previously mentioned is that there should
be no other feasible allocation that is (a) better than the solution for one
negotiator and (b) not worse than the solution for the other
negotiator.137 Thus, an expert attempting to utilize the NBS must be
able to demonstrate from the facts of the case, that this premise, along
with the others, is met. Once this showing is made, the expert can then
apply the NBS, using the model developed by Choi and Weinstein.
Third, the Federal Circuit hinted at the possibility of the exclusion
of the NBS based upon the specific facts of a case. For example, if the
facts of a particular case could not fit the premises of the NBS, the NBS
could not be applied regardless of how clear the expert explained its
methodology or how intimately the facts were tied to the application.
Fourth, the court’s opinion did not render Choi and Weinstein’s
theory useless simply because Weinstein’s application was held
inadmissible. As explained above, if the facts of a case fit the premises
of the NBS, Choi and Weinstein’s model can be used to determine a
reasonable royalty. Here, although Weinstein applied the facts of the
case to his model, evidenced by the deviation from the 50/50 starting
point, he failed to show that the facts of the case fit the starting premises
of the NBS. Thus, Choi and Weinstein’s method is still a useful method
when the premises are met by the facts of a case.
Regardless, because the Federal Circuit did not place an outright
bar on the use of the NBS, it still stands as a reliable method of
calculating patent damages.
E. Post-VirnetX Treatment of the NBS
Since the Federal Circuit’s VirnetX opinion, one district court has
addressed the use of the NBS.138 In Sentius, defendant Microsoft
attempted to exclude plaintiff’s damages expert, Robert Mills.139 Mills
used an approach known as “income theory” to determine the
incremental profits earned by the infringer from the use of the asserted
patents.140 From there, Mills determined how the parties would divide
136. Id.
137. See supra Part I.
138. See Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2015 WL 451950
(Jan. 27, 2015).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *9.
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these incremental profits based on their relative bargaining positions—
the NBS.141 Microsoft argued that Mills’ analysis was flawed because
his “analysis of the parties’ relative bargaining strengths is ‘handwaving at best.’”142
However, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held that Mills did not “follow an unprincipled
‘rule of thumb’ approach similar to the theories that the Federal Circuit
rejected in VirnetX and Uniloc to reach his conclusions about the
relative bargaining power of parties.”143 The court went on to explain
that Mills analyzed how various factors impacted the parties’
bargaining strengths and did not follow an unprincipled “rule of
thumb” approach, similar to the theories that the Federal Circuit
rejected in VirnetX and Uniloc to reach his conclusions about the
relative bargaining power of parties, but unlike in VirnetX, where
Weinstein “relied on ‘rules of thumb’ without establishing that those
rules applied to the hypothetical negotiation at issue.”144
Moreover, Microsoft attempted to argue that Mills’ analysis was
insufficient because his determination of the parties’ bargaining
strength was either generic, favored Microsoft, or did not support any
quantitative value.145 However, the court held that these complaints did
not warrant exclusion of Mills’ analysis because “they either
mischaracterize Mills’ analysis or go to weight, not admissibility.”146
Although the court never explicitly mentions the NBS, it is clear
that Mills’ application of specific facts to determine the parties’ relative
bargaining positions is such an application. Citing the Federal Circuit’s
criticism of the NBS, the court found that Mills’ application was
admissible. This case reaffirms some of the key takeaways mentioned
previously—namely, that the Federal Circuit did not place an outright
bar on the NBS. Additionally, Sentius suggests that experts have
learned from the Federal Circuit’s guidance, and are more equipped to
apply the NBS without judicial hostility.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
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IV. THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION SHOULD BE A VIABLE
METHOD USED IN CALCULATING REASONABLE ROYALTY
DAMAGES IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
Courts should allow the use of the NBS by damages experts as a
viable method for calculating a reasonable royalty in patent
infringement cases for three reasons. First the NBS, if properly used,
adequately applies the facts of each specific case to its analysis.
Second, the NBS is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic
theory that can be adequately explained. Finally, the NBS is more
impartial than the Georgia-Pacific factor analysis.
A. The Nash Bargaining Solution Applies the Facts of the Case
When the NBS is properly used by utilizing the equations set forth
by Choi and Weinstein, it ties the specific facts of each case to its
analysis.147 One of the main criticisms by courts about the NBS is the
lack of tying the specific facts of the case to its analysis.148 However, it
is noteworthy that none of the courts that have excluded the use of the
NBS have explicitly held that the NBS, in and of itself, does not utilize
the specific facts of the case.149 Rather, courts have admonished
damages experts’ lack of tying specific facts of the case in their analysis
of the NBS.150 Therefore, it is not the NBS itself that has been
criticized, but rather, experts’ application of the NBS. It is evident,
upon further examination, that the NBS equations developed by Choi
and Weinstein require facts that are specific to the parties of the case.
First, the variables of the Choi and Weinstein equations require
data that is specific to the parties involved in the hypothetical
negotiation. For example, d1 represents the disagreement profit of the
patent holder.151 To effectively utilize these equations, this variable
must be satisfied with a value that is specific to the patent holder at
issue. Likewise, d2 represents the disagreement profit of the
infringer/licensee.152 This variable must also be satisfied with a value
that is specific to the infringer at issue. Thus, these variables require
direct use of the facts of the case.
147. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that a showing that the specific facts of a
case fits the premises of the NBS has already occurred. Thus, an application of the Choi–
Weinstein model is all that remains to properly apply the NBS.
148. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
149. See supra Part III-C.
150. See Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
151. Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 54.
152. Id.
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As an example, we will assume that the disagreement profit for
both the patent holder and infringer is zero. A value of zero for both of
these variables would mean that “without a license, neither the licensor
nor the licensee obtains benefits from the patented technology.”153 For
purposes of the equations, d1 and d2 equal zero. When these values are
plugged into equations (7) and (8), the result becomes:
1

𝜋𝜋1∗ = Π,
2

1

𝜋𝜋2∗ = Π,
2

(10)
(11)154

These resulting equations demonstrate that when, without a
license, neither party obtains benefit from the patented technology,
each party receives half of the total incremental profit, Π.155 This
scenario demonstrates how the dreaded 50/50 split result from the NBS,
admonished by courts, can occur.156 However, this split did not result
without the use of the facts of the case.
The above calculation is the most simplistic use of the NBS in the
patent-damages context. Obviously, we live in a world with multiple
suppliers, and one or both of the parties will typically have some
disagreement profit—an alternative plan in the case that licensing
negotiations fail. Therefore, d1 and d2 will rarely ever equal zero, but
there are some cases when it will.157 For example, in a suit where
infringement is found, the infringer will be required to stop utilizing
the patented invention.158 Thus, d2 will generally equal zero.159
Additionally, in cases where the patent holder is a non-practicing entity
and does not offer products utilizing the patent, d1 will equal zero
because there will be no profit to be made in the event that a license is
not executed.160
Even when the NBS calculation does not result in a 50/50 split of
incremental profit, the calculation of the NBS still requires the
application of the facts of the case. For example, Choi and Weinstein
demonstrated the result of their equations in a two-supplier world,
where both parties possess production capabilities.161 There, “the
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Weinstein, supra note 31, at 556.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
Weinstein, supra note 31, at 556–57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 58.
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disagreement payoff for the patent holder is the profit it can earn as the
high-cost, sole producer of its patented product.”162 This produces the
following function for solving d1:
𝑑𝑑1 = 𝑃𝑃1 𝑄𝑄1 − 𝐶𝐶1 𝑄𝑄1

(12)163

In this equation, C1(Q1) is the patent holder’s cost function, P1 is
the profit-maximizing price, and Q1 is the profit-maximizing quantity,
absent the infringer.164 Furthermore, the disagreement profit for the
infringer is “equal to the [infringer’s] opportunity cost,” which is the
return foregone from manufacturing the technology.165 This results in
the following total incremental profit function from licensing:
Π = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 (13)166

Plugging these functions into equations (7) and (8) results in the
following:

𝜋𝜋2∗ = 𝑑𝑑2 +

𝜋𝜋1∗ = 𝑑𝑑1 +

𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 −𝐶𝐶2 (𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 )−𝑑𝑑1 −𝑑𝑑2
2

𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 −𝐶𝐶2 (𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 )−𝑑𝑑1 −𝑑𝑑2
2

= 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 , (14)

= 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2 (𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 ) − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 , (15)

𝜋𝜋1∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = Π = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2 (𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 ) (16)167

In these equations, r represents the per-unit royalty.168 Solving for
r results in the following:
1

𝑟𝑟 = [𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶2 ] +
2

1

2𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚

[𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2 ], (17)

where AC2 represents the infringer’s average total cost.169

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 57.
166. Id. at 59.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 57.
169. Id. at 58. (The authors also develop a per-royalty function for the one-supplier world.
Id. at 57–58. The function is as follows:
1
1
[𝑑𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑2 ]
𝑟𝑟 = [𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶2 ] +
2
2𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 1
Id. Additionally, the authors’ equations provide flexibility for other factors. Id. For instance, “if
viable and noninfringing substitutes exist for the patented product, then the elasticity of demand
for the patented product is larger,” which lowers the market power and profitability associated
with the patent. Id. at 60. Furthermore, the existence of substitute products also will have the effect
of lowering d1, which further lowers the royalty rate. Id.).
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It is worth noting that “[i]f both sides have equal disagreement payoffs,
then additional profits achieved from licensing are split equally.”170
Furthermore, the royalty rates change as the disagreement payoffs
change.171 “As one side’s outside opportunity improves, the terms of
the licensing agreement become more favorable.”172
While these equations are complex, and in most cases, will require
a damages expert to calculate a reasonable royalty, it is easy to see that
the NBS requires the use of the specific facts of each case. When used
correctly, courts should not object to damages experts’ use of the NBS
for the reason that it does not apply the specific facts of the case.
However, courts have also complained that the NBS cannot be
adequately explained.
B. The Nash Bargaining Solution Can Be Adequately Explained
Another common complaint among courts excluding the use of
the NBS is the lack of adequate explanation of its theory.173 However,
although mathematically complex, the theory behind the NBS can be
adequately explained such that even a lay juryperson could understand.
In the article by Weinstein, Romig, and Stabile, the authors use the
equations developed by Choi and Weinstein to point out how easily
understandable the NBS is in the context of reasonable royalty
damages.174 The authors explain that:
As previously discussed, the NBS must satisfy two very simple
conditions: (1) no other feasible outcome is better than one side and
not worse than the other and (2) neither side is worse off reaching
an agreement than if no agreement were reached. Additionally, the
“complex mathematical formulas” can be reduced to a single
sentence: each negotiating party receives the profit it would have
made absent an agreement and splits the remaining profits equally.
These concepts are easily understandable by jurors.175

Because the NBS can be explained in a simplified manner, as
demonstrated by Weinstein, Stabile, and Romig, its inadmissibility
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is unwarranted.176 Its
simplified explanation, although grounded in complex mathematics,

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 59.
See id.
See id. at 59–60.
See supra Part III-C.
See Weinstein, supra note 31.
Id. at 560.
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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does not pose any of the risks contained in Rule 403—unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.177 You will recall that in
Oracle, the court took issue with the complex mathematics involved
with the NBS and excluded the expert testimony under Rule 403.178
The court held that “[n]o jury could follow this Greek or testimony
trying to explain it . . . [and the NBS] would invite a miscarriage of
justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption in an impenetrable facade
of mathematics.”179 However, because the NBS does not pose any
threat admonished in Rule 403, exclusion of damages expert opinion
utilizing the NBS under Rule 403 is a grave misapplication of the law.
Additionally, many opponents seek to exclude expert testimony
of the NBS under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702
explains that the role of an expert witness is to “help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”180 The rule
ensures that the expert is credible by requiring that his testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.181 Nowhere in the rule
does it provide that an expert’s testimony may be excluded because of
its complex nature. In fact, most expert testimony is complex in
nature—they are, in fact, experts.
When the NBS is placed against the litmus test of Rule 702, it
passes with flying colors. First, the testimony must help the trier of fact
to understand evidence or determine a fact at issue.182 Here, the NBS is
used to help the trier of fact determine a reasonable royalty rate—a fact
at issue. Therefore, the NBS satisfies this condition.
Next, the testimony of the expert must be based on sufficient facts
or data.183 As discussed in Part IV-A, the calculation of the NBS
requires many data points that are derived directly from the facts.184 In
fact, none of the variables involve values that do not stem from the facts
of the case. While an expert may attempt to apply inaccurate data that
does not stem from the facts of the case, such a practice should go to

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part IV-A.
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the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Therefore, the NBS
also meets this condition.
Additionally, the testimony must be the product of reliable
principles and methods.185 As discussed previously, the NBS has been
in existence for over 60 years.186 Over that span, many economists have
tested its theory.187 Economic literature is replete with articles
describing, testing, and commending the NBS.188 It is now held as
generally accepted economic theory.189 This makes sense, given its
receipt of a Nobel Prize in economics.190 Therefore, the NBS also meets
this condition.
Finally, the expert must reliably apply the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.191 As discussed in Part IV-A, when the values,
stemming from the specific facts of the case, are inputted into the
variables of the NBS, a reasonable royalty rate is calculated.
Accordingly, when a practitioner uses the NBS properly, it is inevitable
that the method and principles of the NBS will be applied with the
specific facts of the case. Thus, the NBS meets this condition and
satisfies all of the conditions of Rule 702.
However, the reliability inquiry of the NBS does not stop there.
The testimony must also overcome a Daubert challenge.192 The notes
of the advisory committee for Rule 702 explain:
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific
factors explicated by the Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert's
technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the
expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or
whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication;
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory
when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

FED. R. EVID. 720.
See supra Part II.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 720.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
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controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally
accepted in the scientific community.193

Because the NBS is a long-standing, generally accepted economic
theory that has been subject to peer-review and extensive publication,
it is apparent that these factors weigh in favor of the NBS’s
193. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“Courts both before and after Daubert
have found other factors relevant in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable
to be considered by the trier of fact.”). These factors include:
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an
unfounded conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)
(noting that in some cases a trial court “may conclude that there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered”).
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious, alternative explanations. See
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony excluded where
the expert failed to consider other obvious causes for the plaintiff’s condition).
Compare Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (the possibility
of some uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most
obvious causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert).
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work
outside his paid litigation consulting.” Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d
940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176
(1999) (Daubert requires the trial court to assure itself that the expert “employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field.”).
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results
for the type of opinion the expert would give. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) (Daubert’s general-acceptance factor does not “help
show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability,
as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles
of astrology or necromancy.”); Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (clinical doctor was properly precluded from testifying to the
toxicological cause of the plaintiff’s respiratory problem, where the opinion was not
sufficiently grounded in scientific methodology); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on “clinical ecology” as
unfounded and unreliable).
All of these factors remain relevant to the determination of the reliability of expert testimony
under the rule as amended. Other factors may also be relevant. See Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1176
(“[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular
case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.”). Yet no single
factor is necessarily dispositive of the reliability of a particular expert’s testimony. See, e.g.,
Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[N]ot only must each stage of
the expert’s testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly
without bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that some expert disciplines
“have the courtroom as a principal theatre of operations” and as to these disciplines “the fact that
the expert has developed an expertise principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be
a substantial consideration.”).
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reliability.194 Even still, a rejection of expert testimony is the exception
rather than the rule.195
Courts should not abandon the use of the NBS simply because it
may be too complex for a jury to understand. Instead, courts should
leave this determination in the hands of the jury. If a jury feels that the
testimony involving the NBS is “a fifty-percent assumption in an
impenetrable facade of mathematics,”196 they can choose to not give
any weight to the expert’s testimony. The reliability of the NBS,
however, is well-established and should not provide a basis for courts
to exclude its use.
C. The Nash Bargaining Solution is More Impartial than the
Manipulable Georgia-Pacific Factor Analysis
While the Georgia-Pacific analysis has been used for over 30
years to calculate a reasonable-royalty rate,197 it is easily manipulable
and should be abandoned in favor of the more impartial NBS. As Choi
and Weinstein point out, the Georgia-Pacific analysis “can produce a
royalty rate unsupported by economic theory.”198
First, the Georgia-Pacific analysis can be easily manipulated and
difficult to understand. For example, a plaintiff, attempting to garner a
high royalty rate, may emphasize a few factors while leaving out other
important factors that may be detrimental to its position.199 Vice versa,
a defendant may emphasize only a few factors in an attempt to establish
a low royalty rate.200 Choi and Weinstein explain that what can result
is “an unsound calculation shrouded by ‘reliance’ on the GeorgiaPacific factors.”201 Professor Tom Cotter from the University of
Minnesota Law School, opined that the “Georgia-Pacific factors . . .
can be easily manipulated by the trier of fact to reach virtually any
outcome.”202 Additionally, one commentator explained that, “[t]he
194. See supra Part I.
195. Id.
196. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
197. See supra INTRODUCTION.
198. Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 51.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Comment, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A
Damages Framework For Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
192, 200 (2011) (quoting Tom Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law
Sch., Remarks at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing On: The Evolving IP Marketplace—
Remedies, Panel 1: Standards for Assessing Patent Damages and Their Implementation by Courts
1, at 39 (Feb. 11, 2009)).
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factors do not give clear guidance on how to calculate damages awards
because there is no standardized way to apply or prioritize the
factors.”203 Moreover, courts have expressed aversion for the GeorgiaPacific analysis. The Federal Circuit has described the Georgia-Pacific
analysis as “a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve more
the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”204 Finally, in Gasser
Chair Co., Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., the court held that “[i]t
would be an affectation of research to cite the countless cases which
simply reiterate the ‘Georgia–Pacific’ factors to be considered in
determining a reasonable royalty. . . . To set out those fifteen factors
would also needlessly burden this decision.”205
Next, the NBS provides a more impartial reasonable-royalty-rate
determination than the Georgia-Pacific analysis. Because the NBS is
mathematical, it provides less wiggle room for manipulability than the
Georgia-Pacific analysis. Conversely, because the Georgia-Pacific
factors are not based upon mathematics, they are analyzed from a
subjective perspective. It would be naïve, however, to assert that the
NBS is wholly impartial. A damages expert could input incorrect
values to manipulate the results, but this manipulation should be more
readily apparent to a jury member. It would be easier for a jury member
to ascertain that the cost variable of an NBS analysis has been
manipulated, than it would to ascertain that a damages expert is
advocating an unreasonable-royalty rate by simply stating the basis for
his rate as a subjective analysis of the various Georgia-Pacific factors.
While the NBS may be a better method than the Georgia-Pacific
analysis, a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of the Georgia-Pacific
analysis is beyond the scope of this article. However, a future article
may be useful to analyze the effectiveness of the NBS compared to the
effectiveness of the Georgia-Pacific analysis.
CONCLUSION
Courts should allow the use of the NBS as a viable method to
calculate a reasonable royalty in patent infringement cases because, if
properly used, the NBS adequately applies the facts of each specific
case, is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic theory, and is
more impartial than the Georgia-Pacific analysis. Courts have
excluded the use of the NBS due to its improper use by damages
203.
204.
205.
1996).

Id.
Fromson v. W. Litho. Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Gasser Chair Co., Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 201, 216 (E.D. N.Y.
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experts. However, as shown here, the NBS, when used correctly,
provides an impartial theory to calculate reasonable royalty damages.
Its theory has been established as sound, accepted economic theory
over the past 60 years, and it is the most useful way to determine an
accurate reasonable royalty. Furthermore, a proper application of the
NBS takes into account the relative bargaining positions of both parties,
and adjusts the royalty rate accordingly.
As recently exemplified in a recent Federal Circuit opinion, proper
use of the NBS is vital to its viability as a proper method to calculate a
reasonable royalty. Accordingly, proper use can be encouraged by a
simple technique used by many mathematics teachers—show your
work. If the equations by Choi and Weinstein are utilized, and damages
experts show how they calculated the values for the variables involved,
courts can rest assured that the damages experts are tying the specific
facts of the case to their analysis.

